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111. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
Spectra Site, LLC, ("Spectra Site") leases a parcel of property from Robert and Brenda
Hall and Mark and Anne Hall located in the Southwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 50
North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian, located in Kootenai County, Idaho. R pp. 147-162.'
Defendants Doug and Brenda Lawrence, husband and wife ("Lawrence"), are the owners of a
parcel of property located in the Southeast Quarter of Section 21, Township 50 North, Range 5
West Boise Meridian, located in Kootenai County, Idaho. At the time Lawrence acquired their
parcel, there existed an unimproved road over, through and across the Lawrence parcel. R p.
142 (Answer to Complaint admitting paragraphs I1 and IV).
Tower Asset Sub, Inc. (Spectra Site's predecessor in the lease) filed a complaint June
27,2003, seeking a finding it had an easement for ingress and egress under four alternative
theories: express easement; implied easement; prescriptive easement; and/or an easement by
necessity. The coplaint also sought an order of the trial court enjoining Lawrence from
interfering with their rights as tenants to use the right of use of the unimproved road for access
to its parcel. R p. 7-23.

' Since there are two appeals, the clerk's record prepared for Supreme Court Docket No. 32092 will be refened to

as Rand the record prepared for Supreme Court Docket No. 35119 will be referred to as Supp R herein.

B. Course of the Proceedings

This matter has previously been on appeal before this Court in Tower Asset Sub Inc. v.
Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710,709, 152 P.3d 581 (2007) seeking reversal of the district court's
grant of summaryjudgment finding an express easement across Lawrence's property. This
Court vacated the summaryjudgment and remanded the matter back to the district court for
further proceedings. In its ruling, this court stated: "[wle hold that Tower, as lessee of the
alleged dominant estate, has standing to seek injunctive relief preventing the Lawrences &om
interfering with its alleged right to use the easement, but lacks standing to seek to quiet title to
the easement."
Following remand, on May 14,2007, Tower renewed its summaryjudgment motion
citing to the above language &om the Supreme Court's appellate decisions, and discussing the
various easement rights which Hall had on the remaining easement theories. The relief
requested was an injunction to prevent Lawrence from interfering with its use of the access
road. Supp R Vol. I, pp. 23-46. On May 31,2007, Lawrence filed for a motion for an
enlargement of time to August 15,2007 to respond to the motion for summary judgment
because Lawrence required additional time to conduct discovery in response to the motion for
summaryjudgment. Supp R Vol I, pp. 56-58.
On June 6,2007, Lawrence's counsel filed a motion to disqualify the district court
judge for cause and an application for an order shortening time to have the matter heard on the
same date scheduled for the summary judgment hearing. Supp R Vol. I, pp. 82-86. Spectra
Site did not object to the request to shorten time when the court heard the motion to disqualify

for cause on June 13,2007. Because the motion to disqualify divested the trial court of
jurisdiction to hear other motions, the motion for summary judgment did not proceed to hearing
at that time as scheduled. Tr p. 4, L1.2-18. On June 25,2007, the trial court issued a written
decision denying the motion for disqualification for cause. Supp R Vol. I, pp. 95-120. A
motion to reconsider was filed July 9,2007, as well as a motion for permission to appeal. Supp
R Vol. I, pp.125-130. An order denying these motions was entered August 2,2007. Supp R
Vol. 11, pp. 351-352.
On July 24,2007, Lawrence filed another motion for enlargement of time to November
1,2007 to respond to Spectra Site's motion for summary judgment, again indicating additional
time was required to conduct discovery. Supp R Vol. I, pp. 153-154. The motion was heard
August 7,2007. The trial court granted the motion for enlargement of time and continued the
summary judgment hearing. Supp R Vol. 111, pp. 457-459.
On November 27,2007, the trial court heard Lawrence's renewed motion to appeal its
denial of Lawrence's motion for an interlocutory appeal of the denial of the motion to
disqualify the trial judge for cause. Tr p. 118. The summary judgment was heard November
28,2007. Tr p. 159. On November 30,2007, the trial court entered an order denying the
renewed motion to proceed with an interlocutory appeal on the denial of the motion to
disqualify. Supp R Vol. 111, pp. 61 1-615.
The District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment on February 6,2008. Supp R Vol. 111, pp. 616-754. This
appeal followed.

C. Statement of Facts

In Lawrence's preface to their statement of facts, they claim that Spectra Site sought a
summary judgment for quiet title. That assertion is not correct. Spectra Site asked the court to
grant summary judgment and "issue a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants fiom
further blocking Plaintiffs access." Supp R Vol. I, p. 35 (Conclusion).
Lawrences brief contains irrelevant matters relating to Capstar Radio Operating
Company (Supreme Court Docket No. 35120) and a conditional use permit. It also contains
cites to the record on appeal in the Capstar case. Spectra Site submits that the facts relevant to
this appeal pertain to its status as a tenant, and its landlord's rights to use the road. These rights
derive fiom various easement theories argued at summary judgment, and the record which this
court should consider on appeal are those contained in the clerk's record for this case.

In 1968, Pike and Agnes Reynolds sold Edward and Colleen Raden and Harold and
Viola Marcoe several parcels of property, including the Southeast Quarter of Section 21,
Township 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian, located in Kootenai County, Idaho and the
adjacent Southwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian,
located in Kootenai County, Idaho. The grant excluded a one acre parcel which had previously
been conveyed to General Telephone Company ("GTC"), and was subject to easements granted
to GTC over and across the Southwest Quarter of Section 22 and the Southeast Quarter of
Section 21. R pp. 49-50.
In 1969, Harold and Marlene Funk ("Funk") entered into a purchase agreement with
Edward and Colleen Raden and Harold and Viola Marcoe which included a sale of the

Southeast Quarter of Section 21, Township 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian, located in
Kootenai County, Idaho (hereafter "Section 21") and the adjacent Southwest Quarter of Section
22, Township 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian, located in Kootenai County, Idaho
except for the one acre parcel which had previously been conveyed to GTC in 1966 (hereafter
"Section 22"). R pp. 51-52. The property was conveyed by a subsequent 1974 warranty deed.
R p. 53-54. At the time Funks purchased the property in 1969, the GTC easement road was the
only existing road providing access to the Funk's real property. R p. 27.
When Pike and Agnes Reynolds granted GTC its parcel in 1966 in Section 22, they
included in the deed an easement over and across the Southwest Quarter of Section 22 and the
Southeast Quarter of Section 21. R p. 83. GTC also obtained an easement from Glen and
Ethel Blossom, husband and wife, over the Southwest Quarter of Section 21. R pp. 84-86.
GTC also obtained an easement for ingress and egress to its parcel across the North Half of the
Northeast Quarter of Section 28. R pp. 87-89. Thus, GTC had recorded easements over the
entire easement road to its parcel.
In 1972, Funk purchased an easement from Wilbur Mead to that portion of the access
road which crossed Mead's property in the Southwest Quarter of Section 21. Supp R Vol. 111,
pp. 645 (Dep. Tr. p. 43, LI. 22-25; p. 44).
In 1975, Funk entered into a purchase agreement to sale the Lawrence parcel to Human
Synergistics, Inc. The sale was evidenced by a recorded Sales Agreement. This sales
agreement indicated that the sale was subject to and including ingress egress easement over the
Lawrence parcel and adjoining property in sections 23 and 22 owned by Funk. R pp. 55-56. A

later warranty deed from Funk to Human Synergistics prepared in 1992 omitted reserving an
easement over the existing access road. R p. 61.
In 1977, Human Synergistics sold the Lawrence parcel to Don and Fern Johnston,
husband and wife, and John and Mary Ann McHugh, husband and wife pursuant to a recorded
contract of sale. R pp. 57-58. A Corporation Deed for this sale was recorded in 1988. R. pp.
60-61.
In 1987, Johnston and McHugh sold the Lawrence parcel to National Associated
Properties, Inc. pursuant to a memorandum of sale. R pp. 59-60. A warranty deed for the
conveyance was recorded in August, 1998. R pp. 67-68.
In June 1996, National Associated Properties, Inc. conveyed the Lawrence parcel to
Arman and Mary Jane Farmanian, husband and wife. R p. 62. On October 1, Farmanian sold
the parcel to Lawrence pursuant to a recorded sale agreement.. R p. 64. A warranty deed from
Farmanians to Lawrence was recorded August, 1998. R p. 69.
Doug Lawrence provided a depiction of the access road that is the subject of this
litigation in his deposition taken in different litigation with Verizon Northwest (GTC's
successor in interest) disputing rights to use the same access road. During the testimony,
Lawrence provided a graphic detail of the access road to its parcel across the various sections
property. R p. 92; 94. This depiction portrayed the GTC access road as commencing at the
county road and passing in a northeasterly direction through Section 21, then taking a sharp

turn southeasterly into Section 28, then changing direction in Section 28 in a course to the
northeast, continuing through the southeast quarter of Section 21 for a short distance and

continuing generally in a northeasterly direction through Section 22 to its terminus at a tower
site. R p. 92-93
A recorded survey of a portion of the access as it existed over and across Section 28 and
the Southeast Quarter of Section 21 was placed in the deposition record. The survey was
consistent with Lawrence's depiction of the GTC easement road. R p. 94.
Further, this access road was depicted by GTC's successor in interest, Verizon
Northwest, Inc., on a U.S. Geological Survey Map as commencing at the public road (identified
on the U.S. Geological Survey map as "Ski Lodge Road"), traversing across the Southwest
Quarter of Section 21, traversing over and across into the East Half of the Northeast Quarter of
Section 28; traversing through the Lawrence parcel in Section 21 ; and terminating in the
Southwest Quarter of Section 22 at an area identified on the U.S. Geological Survey map as a
"Radio Tower" on Blossom Mountain. R pp. 106-113; 121-122. The U.S. G.S. map shows a
route nearly identical in course, direction and configuration of the access road identified by
Lawrence in his deposition, and the sections over and across which it passed.
In 1977, Funk segregated and conveyed the Hall parcel to John Rasmussen and Neil
Chamberlain. R p. 70-71. Rasmussen and Chamberlain conveyed the parcel to James and
Teresa Van Sky in 1978. R. p. 78. Van Sky conveyed the parcel to Switzer Communications,
Inc. in 1981. R. p. 79. In 1995, Switzer conveyed the parcel to Term Cop. In April, 1997,
Term Corp., whose president was Robert Hall and secretary was Mark Hall, conveyed the
parcel to Mark Hall and Robert Hall. R p. 82.

Funks sold the remaining Section 22 property to John Mack in 1992. R p. 139. The
Section 22 property was subdivided into Blossom Mountain Estates in 1998. R p. 96.
On September 20, 1996, immediately prior to signing the Lawrence sale agreement,
Farmanians entered into a mutual agreement, grant of easement and quit claim deed with Mack
concerning their respective parcels. This agreement recited in relevant part that "MACK and
MACK'S predecessors in interest have used a preexisting private road traversing the most
southeasterly portion of the FARMANIAN PROPERTY to gain access to the MACK
PROPERTY. This private road is sometimes known as Blossom Mountain Road (hereinafter
referred to as the "ACCESS ROAD). For illustrative purposes onIy, the approximate location
of the ACCESS ROAD is depicted as a double dashed line on the Exhibit B, attached hereto
and incorporated herein by reference. Exhibit A is an enlargement of the United States
Geological Survey topographical map of the subject area."
This agreement referred to the access road as the historic location of the access road in
more than one location. R pp. 102-105. Further, Exhibit "B" attached to the FarmanianJMack
deed depicted the road using a U.S. Geological Survey map very similar to that used by
Verizon Northwest to portray the GTC access road. Thus, Farmanian and Mack recognized
the GTC easement road as the historical access road being used by Funk and his successor,
Mack , to access the Section 22 property.
Funk testified in his 2004 affidavit that when he purchased the property, the easement
road that was used to access the property was the same road over which GTC had a recorded
access easement. R p. 27. Consistent with his affidavit, Mr. Funk testified in his deposition in

August 2007 that the access road he used when first looking at the property was the GTE
(General Telephone and Electric) access road. Supp R Vol. 111, p. 531 (Dep. Tr p. 18, L1. 1013). There was one gate on the road. Supp R Vol. 111, p. 531 (Dep. Tr p. 18, L1. 25; p. 19, L1.
1-11). Mr. Funk and the realtor drove to the GTE facility using the access road. Supp R Vol.
111, p. 361 (Dep. Tr p. 19, L1. 15-25; p. 20, L1. 1-8.) When Mr. Funk passed over the property
he didn't own he thought he had a right to do so based upon the Mead easement he obtained.
Supp R Vol. 111, p. 536 (Dep Tr p. 53, L.3-25; p. 54). In the six year period before selling the
Lawrence parcel, Funk went to the property 20-30 times himself to target practice and pick
huckleberries. Supp R Vol. 111, p.532 (Dep. Tr. p. 25, L1. 11-25; p. 26, L1. 1-5). When Funk
visited the property, he used the GTE road and went to the GTE tower site. Supp R Vol. 111, p.
536 (Tr. p. 53, L1. 1-24).
Robert Hall testified the site was leased to Tower Asset Sub. R pp. 147-162. Tower
Asset Sub, Inc. merged into Spectra Site in 2007. Supp R Vol. I11 pp. 557-559. Upon motion,
the district court substituted Spectra Site in as the real party in interest. Supp R p. 616.
Hall testified that when Term Corporation purchased in 1995, there was only one road
to the property which also provided access to neighboring properties owned by General
Telephone and Kootenai Electric Company. After Term purchased the property, it allowed
Switzer Communications to continue to operate a communication facility that it had on the
property. Hall testified that in 1997, they leased a portion of the property to Nextel, whom
assigned the lease to Tower Asset Sub in 1999 (now Spectra Site).

IV. ARGUMENT
A. Standard of Review

The Court of Appeal recently reiterated the standard of review in a case to be tried to
the court. In Johnson v. McPhee, -Idaho

,

P.3d -(Ct. App. 2009), the court

stated:
On review of an order granting summaryjudgment, this court uses the
same legal standard as that used by the trial court. Friel v. Boise City House.
Auth., 126 Idaho 484,485,887 P.2d 29,30 (1994); WashingtonFed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Lash, 121 Idaho 128,130,823 P.2d 162,164 (1992). Summary
judgment may be entered only if "the pleadings, deposition, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). See also Avila v. Wahlquist, 126
Idaho 745,747,890 P.2d 331,333 (1995); Idaho Bldg. ContractorsAss'n v.
City of Coeur d'iilene, 126 Idaho 740,742,890 P.2d 326,328 (1995). When a
summaryjudgment motion has been supported by depositions, affidavits or
other evidence, the adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of that party's pleadings, but by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
the rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e). See also Gardner v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925,929,719 P.2d
1185, 1189 (1986). In order to survive a motion for summaryjudgment the
plaintiff need not prove that an issue will be decided in its favor at trial; rather, it
must simply show that there is a triable issue. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation
Co., 119 Idaho 514,524,808 P.2d 851, 861 (1991). A mere scintilla of evidence
or only a slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient to withstand summary
judgment; there must be sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably
return a verdict for the party opposing summaryjudgment. Corbridge v. Clark
Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87,730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986); Petricevich v.
Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865,871,452 P.2d 362,368 (1969).
When a court considers a motion for summaryjudgment in a case that
would be tried to a jury, all facts are to be liberally construed, and all reasonable
inferences must be drawn in favor of the party resisting the motion. G & M
Farms, 119 Idaho at 517,808 P.2d at 854; Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist.,
125 Idaho 872,874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1994). The rule is different
however when, as here, a jury trial has not been requested. In that event, because
the court would be the fact-finder at trial, on a summaryjudgment motion the

court is entitled to draw the most vrobable inferences from the undisputed
evidence properly before it, and may grant the summary judgment despite the
possibility of conflicting inferences. P.O. Ventures,Inc. v. Loucks Family
irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233,237,159 P.3d 870,874 (2007); Inter~ountain
Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. Louisiana PaciJic C o p , 136 Idaho 233,235,31 P.3d 921,
923 (2001); Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189, 191,923 P.2d 434,436 (1996).
Inferences thus drawn by a trial court will not be disturbed on appeal if the
record reasonably supports them. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140
Idaho 354,360-61,93 P.3d 685,691-92 (2004); Intermountain Forest Mgmt.,
Inc., 136 Idaho at 236,31 P.3d at 924.
A

B.

The District Court did not Err in Finding Spectra Site's Landlord had the
Right to Use the Access Road pursuant to Various Easement Theories

On remand, the trial court was advised by this Court's previous decision that Tower, as
lessee of Hall, had standing to seek injunctive relief preventing Lawrence from interfering with
its alleged right to use the easement, but lacked standing to seek to quiet title to the easement
itself. This Court stated, "we agree with the Restatement (Third) of Property that an individual
has standing to enforce the right to use an easement if he or she has the right to benefit from the
easement. Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes 5 8.1 (2000). Therefore, title ownership
of the dominant estate is not a necessary prerequisite to obtain standing to enforce the right to
use an easement." Tower Asset Sub Inc v. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 152 P.3d 581,584

The trial court observed in its memorandum opinion that at the time of the first appeal,
footnote 1 reflected that this Court was of the opinion that Tower had submitted uncontroverted
evidence that the Hall parcel was intended to have the benefit of the access road easement

across the Lawrence parcel. Lawrence contends the trial court should not have utilized
footnote 1 in its analysis of the issues on remand.
The trial court did not rule that this foot note comment by the Supreme Court relieved
Spectra Site of proving that its landlord, Hall, had an easement right of which it could claim the
benefit. The trial court merely observed that this Court observed that at time of its first opinion
on appeal tat Tower had presented uncontroverted evidence in the record before it that the Hall
parcel was intended to have the benefit of the access road.
The trial court's opinion was issued jointly in the present case and the Capstar case
(Supreme Court Docket No. 35120) and recognized that Tower asset its motion for summary
judgment based on the remaining easement theories raised in its complaint. In the jointly
issued opinion, the trial court reviewed the chain of title and the evaluated the intent expressed
in the sales agreement of the Lawrence property that Funk's remaining property. The trial
court found would continue to have the right to traverse the access road across the Lawrence
parcel for access to the retained Section 22 property. The trial court incorporated its previous
analysis of the three easement theories from the Capstar discussion portion of its memorandum.
Most importantly, the trial court concluded Hall had the same easement rights, and Spectra
Site, as its tenant, could use them.
The trial court's comment regarding the evidence in the record on summary judgment
was for the benefit of indicating that there was nothing presented to the trial court in opposition
to the renewed motion for summary judgment that controverted the other easement theories
discussed in this Court's footnote. The trial court noted that its previous discussion in its

Capstar analysis addressing the theories of implied easement, easement by necessity and
prescriptive easement was equally applicable to Spectra Site. Supp R p. 652. Thus, the trial
court engaged in the proper analysis on the separate easement theories and did not commit
error.
C. The District Court did not Err in Considering the Easement Theories as Grounds
for Summary Judgment

In a related argument, Lawrence claims that the proper causes of action were not before
the trial court. Lawrence claims Spectra Site pursued the wrong theories, citing to a portion of
Spectra Site's brief and implying that Spectra Site was seeking to quiet title to an easement.
This argument is without merit for the following reasons.
First, in its memorandum in support of the renewed motion for summaryjudgment,
Spectra Site cited the holding of this Court that "Tower will have standing to seek injunctive
relief if it can establish it has an alleged legal right to benefit from the Blossom Road easement.
As lessee of the alleged dominant estate, Tower derives its right to use the alleged easement
from its lessor, Hall." R p.24. The memorandum proceeded to discuss the easement rights Hall
had in the road under theories of implied easement, easement by necessity and prescriptive
easement. It concluded: "For the foregoing reasons and under the foregoing legal theories, the
Court should grant Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and issue a permanent injunction
prohibiting Defendants from further blocking Plaintiffs access." It did not seek a quiet title in
its favor.

Next, the trial court recognized that Spectra Site sought relief consistent with this
Court's first opinion. The trial court held: "Tower Asset has proven they are entitled to
injunctive relief, as their landlord, the Halls, have an easement over Lawrences (sic) land
established by prior use, by necessity and by prescription and Lawrences have failed to
establish a material fact in dispute as to any of these theories." R pp. 653-654.
Lawrence argues that this Court's previous decision stands for the proposition that
Spectra Site was precluded from arguing that their land was burdened by a servitude under any
easement theory absent a prior quiet title action by Hall establishing these rights. Lawrence
cites to no legal authority for this argument on appeal.
More importantly, existing legal authority contradicts this position. "Any one rightfully
in possession of the premises to which an easement is appurtenant may maintain an action for
injury to or disturbance thereof. Accordingly, it has been held that a lessee or a tenant at will
may maintain the action." 28A C.J.S. Easements $ 258.
The issues before the trial court were: (1) was Spectra Site rightfully in possession of
the premises (dominant estate); and (2) did Spectra Site's landlord have an appurtenant
easement based upon the theories of implied easement, easement by necessity or prescriptive
easement. The trial court was correct when it determined that there was no question of fact that
Spectra Site was rightfully in possession of the dominant estate and that Halls had an easement
appurtenant based upon all three easement theories.
Lastly and in the alternative, if Lawrence was correct and the previous Supreme Court
opinion precluded any further discussion of Hall's easement rights on remand, then the

alternative question must be asked as to the law of the case as established in the first appeal.
This Court found that it was established at the time of the first appeal that Tower was a tenant
of Hall. Its foot note indicated that the record on appeal was uncontroverted that Hall had an
easement right. On remand, the trial court held that the lease was for use of the dominant
parcel, and required access. Thus, if Lawrence's logic is followed and the remand was not
intended to require Tower to establish Hall had easements appurtenant under the remaining
easement theories, then the trial court properly granted summary judgment based upon the law
of the case as established on appeal.

D. Lawrence does not Support their Claim that there were Genuine Issues of Material
Fact Regarding the Various Easement Theories
Without any recitation to the record, Lawrence claims on appeal that the court
summarily dismissed their evidence and completely ignored contradictory evidence. The facts
cited in support of this argument is that the court misspoke when it said Nextel assigned the
Access License Agreement to Capstar, when in fact the Access License agreement was
assigned to Tower. The other fact recited by Lawrence is an error in the Capstar discussion
about the years Funk used the easement road after the sale of the Lawrence parcel. Lawrence
does not expand thier argument on how these two items would create a genuine issue of
material fact or change the outcome of the summary judgment proceeding.
At the trial court level, Lawrence's argument only addressed the element of adverse use.
Lawrence claimed Spectra Site had not established adversity because use of the road by Tower

was permissive based upon their interpretation of the affidavit of ~ e b e o r .Supp
~ R Vol. I, p.
173. The trial court rejected this argument. Lawrence provided no argument or contradictory
facts on appeal indicating error in the trial court's analysis.
Lawrence also argued to the trial court that use of the access road was not prescriptive
because it was in common with Lawrence. Supp R Vol. I, p. 177. The trial court rejected this
argument. Lawrence did not expand this argument.

In the recent case of Backman v. Lawrence, -Idaho

,

P.3d -(2009 Opinion

No. 68) this court reiterated that "Idaho Appellate Rule 35, which governs the content of briefs
on appeal, requires that '[tlhe argument . . . contain the contentions of the appellant with
respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities,
statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon.' I.A.R. 35(a)(6) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, this Court has held that issues on appeal that are not supported by propositions of
law or authority are deemed waived and will not be considered. Hall v. Farmers Alliance Mut.

Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313, 323, 179 P.3d 276,286 (2008)"
On appeal, Lawrence provides no argument or facts why these finding were in error.
They merely invite this Court to search for error based on their allegations of such.

E. The District Court did not Err in Rejecting Defendants' Laches and Statute of
imitation Claims
Lawrence argues on appeal that Spectra Site was required in its complaint to allege that
it would be relying upon easement rights established by its predecessors in interest in order to

It does not appear Lawrence included this affidavit in the appellate record.

proceed with its suit. Lawrence presents no case law or argument why this statement supports
a claim of laches. Further, Spectra Site's complaint did claim its predecessors in title had used
Blossom Mountain Road as it crossed the Defendants' real property for access to Hall's real
properly openly, notoriously, continuously, adversely and under claim of right for a period
exceeding five (5) years. R p. 01 1.
Lawrence also challenges the trial court's finding that there was no evidence in the
record before it justifying application of the doctrine of laches. On appeal, Lawrence claims
they were prejudiced because the severance occurred nearly 33 years ago without any hrther
explanation or argument. This argument was not presented to the trial court. It is difficult to
ascertain on appeal the prejudice Lawrence claims to have suffered. A response is not possible
to a non-existent argument.
Although contained in its statement of the issue, Lawrence did not present argument on
the error it claimed the trial court made in relation to their statute of limitation defense. This
Court has consistently indicated it will not consider assignments of error not supported by
argument and authority in the opening brief. Jorgenson v. Coppedge,

Idaho,

181 P.3d

P. The District Court did not Err in Striking Portions of the Affidavits Filed by
Lawrence
Lawrence contends the trial court erred in striking portions of their affidavits while
leaving intact those affidavits submitted by Capstar. Despite this general complaint regarding
the amount of material submitted and stricken, Lawrence presents no case law or argument why

this Court should find on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion. Again, this Court
should not consider this issue on appeal absent being presented argument and legal authority.
G. The District Court Properly Considered and Ruled Upon Lawrence's Motion to
Disqualify for Cause
Lawrence argues avidly that the district judge should have disqualified himself.
Lawrence claims the trial court's impartiality could reasonably be questioned.
When a court is faced with a motion to disqualify for bias or prejudice under I.R.C.P.
40(d)(2), the trial judge need only conclude that he can properly perform the legal analysis
which the law requires of him. State v. Pratt, 128 Idaho 207 (Ct. App. 912 P.2d 94 (1996).
Adverse rulings in the case do not disqualify the judge; in order to be grounds for
disqualification, bias must stem from the judge forming opinion on merits of case on some
basis other than what has been learned from presiding over it. Desfosses v. Desfosses, 122
Idaho 634,836 P.2d 1095 (Ct.App. 1992); Bell v. Bell, 122 Idaho 520,835 P.2d 1331 (Ct.App.
1992); Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84,996 P.2d 303, (2000).
In order for disqualification to be appropriate under I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2)(A)(4), the alleged
prejudice must stem from an extra-judicial source. Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 133
Idaho 826,992 P.2d 1226 (Ct. App.1999). Any such disqualification for cause shall be
accompanied by an affidavit of the party or the party's attorney stating distinctly the grounds
upon which disqualification is based and the facts relied upon in support of the motion. Rule
40(d)(2)(B). The moving party bears the burden of providing facts to support the stated
grounds for disqualification and suspicion, surmise, speculation, rationalization, conjecture,

innuendo, and statements of mere conclusions may not be substituted for a statement of facts.

DesFosses v. DesFosses, 120 Idaho 27,813 P.2d 366 (Ct.App.1991).

In support of this argument, Lawrence claims that over the course of the litigation, it
was their perception that the judge disregarded meritorious arguments made by them. They
also cite to the fact that the judge disqualified himself without cause in a former case involving
their legal counsel at the time (John Whelan). Lawrence also argues that the fact that the court
took the motion to disqualify under advisement and then issued a written opinion was a clear
indicator that the court was no longer impartial and had a stake in the proceedings. Lawrence
also takes umbrage with rulings with which they disagreed in this case and the case with
Capstar. Lawrence argues on appeal that rulings favorable to Spectra Site demonstrate that the
district judge was "just a tool of these corporations."
Finally, Lawrence claims that the evidentiary rulings made on motions to strike display
the district judge's prejudice against them. However, as noted in the previous section,
Lawrence cites to no evidentiary rule or case in support of the claim that the trial court
committed error in striking portions of their submitted affidavits. On summary judgment, a
trial court is only allowed to consider admissible evidence. Posey v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,
111 P.3d 162 (Idaho Ct.App. 2005). Lawrence provides no argument that the stricken portions
of affidavits were admissible evidence, or that the trial court abused its discretion in striking the
affidavit testimony.
The trial court issued a thorough opinion that enunciated its reasons for denying
Lawrence's motion for disqualification for cause. Supp R Vol. 11, pp. 95-120. This

memorandum sets forth the reasons the trial court refused the motion and clearly addressed the
concerns raised by Lawrence to the trial court. The evidentiary rulings made by the trial court
were supported by the rules of evidence. The main foundation of the alleged error is that the
trial court issued adverse rulings with which Lawrence disagreed.
The final ground upon which Lawrence appeals is that the trial court looked outside the
record into those cases raised by Mr. Whelan as being ones in which the court demonstrated
prejudice against him. Lawrence deems this an inappropriate independent investigation by the
trial court.
The Court informed counsel it did not have a recall of one of the cases discussed at
hearing but not raised in the brief and that it would look at it and the other cases cited in the
brief. Tr p. 26, L1. 6-17. Lawrence's counsel did not express an objection to that process.
Lawrence argues it was improper for the trial court to consider these cases and discuss them in
its opinion. These were cases referenced by Lawrence's attorney from which alleged prejudice
could be determined. Lawrence cites to no case authority that it was improper for a trial court
to review these cases to refresh the trial court's recall in order to give due consideration to
Lawrence's argument that actions occurred in the cases that could cause an appearance of bias.
Further, Lawrence presents nothing to support his claim that it was improper for a court to take
a matter under advisement and issue a written opinion.

V. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Lawrence seeks attorney fees on appeal because they perceive Spectra Site to be part of
a large corporate conglomerate and that it has engaged in a conspiracy to take his property
rights. This request does not comport with I.A.R. 41. To the extent that this could be deemed a
claim for attorney fees pursuant to I.C. 12-121, Spectra Site has not pursued its defense of this
appeal frivolously.

VI. CONCLUSION

On appeal, Lawrence has failed to establish that the trial court committed
reversible error. Spectra Site submits that the trial court's decision should be
affirmed.
SUBMITTED this 22nd day of May, 2009.
JAMES, VERNON &WEEKS, P.A.
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